

## Appendix A. Additional Tables

Table A.1: Elicited norms for tax-framed and neutrally-framed Democrats

Final allocation ("Keep")	Panel A: Endowment - 0 Tokens													
	Tax framed Democratic norm ratings					Neutrally framed Democratic norm ratings								
	Mean	---	---	---	---	Mean	---	---	---	---				
0, 10	-0.05	29.55%	12.88%	11.36%	7.58%	13.64%	25.00%	0.54	7.89%	7.02%	4.39%	8.77%	16.67%	55.26%
1, 9	0.08	18.94%	14.39%	11.36%	12.88%	17.42%	25.00%	"Take 1"	6.14%	9.65%	15.79%	14.91%	16.67%	36.84%
2, 8	0.17	6.82%	15.91%	16.67%	20.45%	18.18%	21.97%	"Take 2"	5.26%	9.65%	18.42%	13.16%	20.18%	33.33%
3, 7	0.25	1.82%	9.85%	20.45%	25.76%	28.79%	13.64%	"Take 3"	6.14%	11.40%	14.91%	14.91%	27.19%	28.44%
4, 6	0.29	0.76%	5.30%	19.70%	33.33%	27.27%	13.64%	"Take 4"	5.26%	11.40%	10.53%	19.30%	35.96%	17.54%
5, 5	0.45	1.52%	4.55%	16.67%	18.18%	25.76%	33.33%	"Take 5"	6.14%	7.02%	12.28%	16.67%	28.07%	29.82%
6, 4	-0.16	9.09%	23.48%	36.36%	13.64%	13.64%	3.79%	"Take 6"	13.16%	24.56%	41.23%	14.91%	4.39%	1.75%
7, 3	-0.35	20.45%	37.88%	19.70%	8.33%	7.58%	6.06%	"Take 7"	-0.51	21.93%	47.37%	23.68%	2.63%	1.75%
8, 2	-0.45	34.85%	33.33%	10.61%	7.58%	9.09%	4.55%	"Take 8"	-0.65	40.35%	43.86%	9.65%	0.88%	3.51%
9, 1	-0.54	48.48%	24.24%	9.09%	3.79%	11.36%	3.03%	"Take 9"	-0.74	59.65%	28.95%	5.26%	1.75%	2.63%
10, 0	-0.61	61.36%	16.67%	4.55%	3.79%	8.33%	5.80%	"Take 10"	-0.71	64.91%	21.05%	5.26%	0.00%	1.75%
Panel B: Endowment - 5 Tokens														
Final allocation ("Keep")	Tax framed Democratic norm ratings					Neutrally framed Democratic norm ratings								
	Mean	---	---	---	---	Mean	---	---	---	---				
	0, 10	-0.3	40.91%	15.91%	9.85%	7.58%	12.88%	12.88%	0.47	8.77%	7.89%	3.51%	15.79%	14.04%
1, 9	-0.22	31.06%	20.45%	9.09%	13.64%	12.12%	13.64%	"Give 5"	1.75%	10.53%	7.89%	12.28%	17.54%	50.00%
2, 8	-0.09	15.91%	23.48%	18.94%	13.64%	15.91%	12.12%	"Give 4"	0.58	0.88%	6.14%	7.89%	14.91%	23.68%
3, 7	0.09	6.82%	16.67%	19.70%	22.73%	21.97%	12.12%	"Give 3"	0.58	0.88%	2.63%	6.14%	18.42%	35.09%
4, 6	0.22	4.55%	9.09%	16.67%	31.06%	24.24%	14.39%	"Give 2"	0.63	0.00%	0.88%	3.51%	16.67%	44.74%
5, 5	0.67	2.27%	3.03%	6.82%	6.82%	24.24%	56.82%	"Give 1"	0.68	1.75%	0.88%	3.51%	16.67%	42.98%
6, 4	-0.15	15.15%	17.42%	32.58%	17.42%	10.61%	6.82%	"Do not involve government"	-0.18	18.42%	48.25%	11.40%	9.65%	3.51%
7, 3	-0.4	21.21%	37.12%	23.48%	8.33%	7.58%	2.27%	"Take 1"	-0.43	16.67%	43.86%	27.19%	7.02%	3.51%
8, 2	-0.48	34.09%	35.61%	12.88%	5.30%	6.82%	5.30%	"Take 2"	-0.57	30.70%	46.49%	15.79%	2.63%	2.63%
9, 1	-0.54	52.27%	18.94%	9.85%	6.06%	6.82%	6.06%	"Take 3"	-0.69	49.12%	38.60%	5.26%	2.63%	2.63%
10, 0	-0.58	61.36%	12.88%	4.55%	4.55%	13.64%	3.03%	"Take 4"	-0.72	71.05%	15.79%	0.88%	1.75%	5.26%
Panel C: Endowment - 10 Tokens														
Final allocation ("Keep")	Tax framed Democratic norm ratings					Neutrally framed Democratic norm ratings								
	Mean	---	---	---	---	Mean	---	---	---	---				
	0, 10	-0.26	43.94%	11.36%	8.33%	7.58%	9.09%	19.70%	0.44	11.40%	7.89%	6.14%	13.16%	7.89%
1, 9	-0.15	31.06%	18.18%	9.85%	9.85%	10.61%	20.45%	"Give 10"	0.49	6.14%	10.53%	7.02%	11.40%	53.51%
2, 8	-0.03	15.15%	27.27%	10.61%	13.64%	13.64%	19.70%	"Give 9"	0.55	2.63%	7.02%	10.53%	11.40%	50.88%
3, 7	0.14	6.82%	13.64%	27.27%	12.88%	19.70%	19.70%	"Give 8"	0.64	0.88%	5.26%	6.14%	14.04%	54.39%
4, 6	0.27	2.27%	7.58%	24.24%	20.45%	26.52%	18.94%	"Give 7"	0.64	0.00%	3.51%	5.26%	12.28%	43.86%
5, 5	0.63	0.76%	3.03%	6.82%	13.64%	28.79%	46.97%	"Give 6"	0.78	0.88%	0.00%	1.75%	6.14%	33.33%
6, 4	0.27	0.76%	5.30%	21.97%	30.30%	30.30%	11.36%	"Give 5"	0.21	0.00%	7.02%	28.07%	27.19%	29.82%
7, 3	-0.01	2.27%	26.52%	24.24%	21.97%	18.94%	6.06%	"Give 4"	-0.03	5.26%	21.05%	30.70%	16.67%	21.05%
8, 2	-0.2	13.64%	34.09%	15.15%	18.18%	13.64%	5.30%	"Give 3"	-0.21	8.77%	40.35%	17.54%	15.79%	13.16%
9, 1	-0.35	31.82%	25.76%	13.64%	12.12%	9.09%	7.58%	"Give 2"	-0.29	20.18%	35.09%	14.04%	13.16%	4.39%
10, 0	-0.52	48.48%	18.94%	12.12%	8.33%	8.33%	3.79%	"Give 1"	-0.41	37.72%	27.19%	10.53%	7.89%	7.89%
								"Do nothing"						

Notes: 1. Significant at the \*\*\* 1 percent, \*\* 5 percent, and \* 10 percent levels.  
 2. Responses are: "very socially inappropriate" (- - -), "socially inappropriate" (-), "somewhat socially inappropriate" (+), "socially appropriate" (+ +), and "very socially appropriate" (+ + +). Modal responses are shaded in gray. To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores ("very socially inappropriate" = -1, "socially inappropriate" = -0.6, "somewhat socially inappropriate" = -0.2, "socially appropriate" = 0.2, "very socially appropriate" = 0.6, and "very socially appropriate" = 1).

Table A.2: Elicited norms for tax-framed and neutrally-framed Republicans

		Panel A: Endowment - 0 Tokens											
Final allocation ("Keep")	Action	Tax framed Republican norm ratings					Neutrally framed Republican norm ratings						
		Mean	---	--	-	+	Mean	---	--	-	+		
0, 10	"Do not involve government"	0.16	27.94%	7.35%	5.88%	11.76%	41.18%	16.92%	3.08%	3.08%	7.69%	15.38%	53.85%
1, 9	"Take tax transfer 1"	0.06	19.12%	16.18%	10.29%	16.18%	27.94%	10.77%	12.31%	18.46%	13.85%	21.54%	23.08%
2, 8	"Take tax transfer 2"	0.06	11.76%	25.00%	11.76%	5.88%	29.41%	16.92%	15.38%	20.00%	10.77%	23.08%	23.08%
3, 7	"Take tax transfer 3"	0.1	11.76%	13.24%	16.18%	20.59%	23.53%	15.38%	12.31%	27.69%	16.92%	15.38%	15.38%
4, 6	"Take tax transfer 4"	0.05	13.24%	19.12%	13.24%	16.18%	14.71%	12.31%	12.31%	23.08%	9.23%	32.31%	10.77%
5, 5	"Take tax transfer 5"	0.1	16.18%	14.71%	13.24%	14.71%	26.47%	10.77%	15.38%	12.31%	20.00%	24.62%	3.08%
6, 4	"Take tax transfer 6"	-0.34	23.53%	25.00%	27.94%	11.76%	1.47%	18.46%	29.23%	26.15%	10.77%	12.31%	3.08%
7, 3	"Take tax transfer 7"	-0.54	33.82%	38.24%	11.76%	11.76%	2.94%	47.69%	7.69%	13.85%	4.62%	0.00%	0.00%
8, 2	"Take tax transfer 8"	-0.62	50.00%	27.94%	8.82%	4.41%	7.35%	44.62%	4.62%	9.23%	6.15%	1.54%	3.08%
9, 1	"Take tax transfer 9"	-0.68	61.76%	20.59%	2.94%	8.82%	2.94%	35.38%	21.54%	4.62%	9.23%	6.15%	3.08%
10, 0	"Take tax transfer 10"	-0.76	75.00%	11.76%	4.41%	0.00%	5.88%	64.62%	18.46%	4.62%	1.54%	4.62%	6.15%

		Panel B: Endowment - 5 Tokens											
Final allocation ("Keep")	Action	Tax framed Republican norm ratings					Neutrally framed Republican norm ratings						
		Mean	---	--	-	+	Mean	---	--	-	+		
0, 10	"Make tax transfer 5"	-0.52	64.71%	7.35%	4.41%	4.41%	14.71%	15.38%	3.08%	12.31%	9.23%	16.92%	43.08%
1, 9	"Make tax transfer 4"	-0.46	47.06%	22.06%	7.35%	7.35%	5.88%	10.29%	10.77%	9.23%	24.62%	40.00%	40.00%
2, 8	"Make tax transfer 3"	-0.32	29.41%	27.94%	14.71%	8.82%	10.29%	17.65%	13.85%	15.38%	21.62%	33.85%	33.85%
3, 7	"Make tax transfer 2"	0.11	11.76%	27.94%	17.65%	17.65%	7.35%	13.85%	10.77%	13.85%	30.77%	33.85%	33.85%
4, 6	"Make tax transfer 1"	0.16	5.88%	10.29%	25.00%	19.12%	26.47%	3.08%	3.08%	6.15%	21.54%	40.00%	26.15%
5, 5	"Do not involve government"	0.81	2.94%	0.00%	2.94%	7.35%	77.94%	4.62%	1.54%	3.08%	9.23%	41.54%	40.00%
6, 4	"Take tax transfer 1"	-0.14	11.76%	25.00%	30.88%	10.29%	11.76%	12.31%	24.62%	33.85%	16.92%	9.23%	3.08%
7, 3	"Take tax transfer 2"	-0.45	27.94%	36.76%	17.65%	5.88%	10.29%	18.46%	38.46%	26.15%	3.08%	10.77%	3.08%
8, 2	"Take tax transfer 3"	-0.54	42.65%	32.35%	10.29%	1.47%	7.35%	33.85%	38.46%	13.85%	4.62%	7.69%	1.54%
9, 1	"Take tax transfer 4"	-0.59	54.41%	25.00%	4.41%	4.41%	7.35%	46.15%	38.46%	6.15%	3.08%	6.15%	0.00%
10, 0	"Take tax transfer 5"	-0.68	72.06%	7.35%	5.88%	5.88%	8.82%	61.54%	27.69%	3.08%	3.08%	3.08%	1.54%

		Panel C: Endowment - 10 Tokens											
Final allocation ("Keep")	Action	Tax framed Republican norm ratings					Neutrally framed Republican norm ratings						
		Mean	---	--	-	+	Mean	---	--	-	+		
0, 10	"Make tax transfer 10"	-0.55	66.18%	8.82%	4.41%	2.94%	1.47%	16.18%	7.69%	18.46%	12.31%	10.77%	36.92%
1, 9	"Make tax transfer 9"	-0.43	51.47%	17.65%	5.88%	2.94%	5.88%	16.18%	12.31%	9.23%	18.46%	13.85%	35.38%
2, 8	"Make tax transfer 8"	-0.35	36.76%	26.47%	8.82%	7.35%	5.88%	14.71%	12.31%	15.38%	10.77%	23.08%	35.38%
3, 7	"Make tax transfer 7"	-0.14	25.00%	20.59%	10.29%	19.12%	8.82%	16.18%	7.69%	16.92%	18.46%	18.46%	35.38%
4, 6	"Make tax transfer 6"	-0.07	19.12%	22.06%	13.24%	11.76%	20.59%	13.24%	1.54%	12.31%	18.46%	32.31%	32.31%
5, 5	"Make tax transfer 5"	0.25	16.18%	10.29%	13.24%	7.35%	41.18%	0.00%	1.54%	3.08%	9.23%	26.15%	60.00%
6, 4	"Make tax transfer 4"	-0.03	7.35%	20.59%	25.00%	22.06%	19.12%	5.88%	7.69%	16.92%	23.08%	35.38%	16.92%
7, 3	"Make tax transfer 3"	-0.09	8.82%	17.65%	29.41%	30.88%	4.41%	29.23%	16.92%	29.23%	16.92%	27.69%	9.23%
8, 2	"Make tax transfer 2"	-0.17	13.24%	26.47%	22.06%	19.12%	16.18%	7.69%	26.15%	20.00%	12.31%	23.08%	10.77%
9, 1	"Make tax transfer 1"	-0.15	25.00%	23.53%	10.29%	11.76%	13.24%	12.31%	29.23%	12.31%	13.85%	23.08%	9.23%
10, 0	"Do not involve government"	-0.13	36.76%	14.71%	5.88%	10.29%	26.47%	20.00%	20.00%	9.23%	13.85%	21.54%	7.69%

Notes: 1. Significant at the \*\*\* 1 percent, \*\* 5 percent, and \* 10 percent levels.  
 2. Responses are: "very socially inappropriate" (---), "socially inappropriate" (--), "somewhat socially inappropriate" (-), "somewhat socially appropriate" (+), "socially appropriate" (++) and "very socially appropriate" (+++). Modal responses are shaded in gray. To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores ("very socially inappropriate" = -1, "socially inappropriate" = -0.6, "somewhat socially inappropriate" = -0.2, "somewhat socially appropriate" = 0.2, "socially appropriate" = 0.6, and "very socially appropriate" = 1).

Table A.3: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests testing equality of norm ratings across endowments

Keep	Endowments 0 vs. 5	Endowments 0 vs. 10	Endowments 5 vs. 10
0	1.398	2.922	1.754
1	-3.690***	-2.201	2.233
2	-4.721***	-4.314***	1.105
3	-5.010***	-6.087***	-0.648
4	-6.500***	-6.958***	-0.913
5	-6.297***	-8.130***	-3.422**
6	-2.246	-8.926***	-7.663***
7	-3.319**	-9.234***	-7.591***
8	-2.223	-8.450***	-7.459***
9	-1.278	-8.181***	-8.436***
10	1.637	-5.999***	-7.591***

Significant at the \*\*\* 1 percent, \*\* 5 percent, and \* 10 percent levels with Bonferroni correction; all two-tailed.

Table A.4: Mann-Whitney  $U$  tests testing neutrally framed Democratic and Republican norm ratings

Keep	Endowment 0	Endowment 5	Endowment 10
0	0.504	1.062	1.967
1	1.801	1.298	2.218
2	2.478	1.979	1.979
3	2.247	1.270	2.887
4	2.105	1.900	2.061
5	1.988	0.761	0.031
6	0.442	0.572	-1.985
7	0.382	-0.472	-1.877
8	-0.893	-0.228	-2.232
9	-1.107	-0.500	-2.284
10	-0.152	-0.933	-2.117

Significant at the \*\*\* 1 percent, \*\* 5 percent, and \* 10 percent levels with Bonferroni correction; all two-tailed.

Table A.5: Mann-Whitney  $U$  tests testing the effect of frame on norm ratings by identity

Panel A: Tax framed and neutrally framed Democrats			
Keep	Endowment 0	Endowment 5	Endowment 10
0	5.775***	7.506***	6.500***
1	2.811	7.742***	6.352***
2	2.052	7.709***	6.343***
3	1.090	6.681***	6.440***
4	0.773	6.471***	5.679***
5	-0.743	-1.191	2.488
6	-1.806	-0.302	-1.084
7	-1.908	-0.189	-0.154
8	-2.194	-0.617	-0.034
9	-2.459	-0.873	1.078
10	-0.867	-1.755	1.442
Panel B: Tax framed and neutrally framed Republicans			
Keep	Endowment 0	Endowment 5	Endowment 10
0	1.870	5.733***	5.646***
1	0.716	6.16***	5.049***
2	0.087	5.74***	5.487***
3	-0.288	4.881***	4.241***
4	0.264	3.473**	4.595***
5	0.355	-3.872***	3.606**
6	0.504	-0.544	3.931***
7	0.541	1.111	2.321
8	1.129	0.706	1.523
9	0.826	0.331	0.841
10	1.249	0.637	-0.268

Significant at the \*\*\* 1 percent, \*\* 5 percent, and \* 10 percent levels with Bonferroni correction; all two-tailed.

## Appendix B. Additional tests of the initial endowments

We also find that the initial endowment affects dictator choice even in the neutral frame. According to an OLS regression, for each extra token initially endowed to the dictator, the dictator keeps an additional 0.059 tokens ( $p < 0.01$ ). As noted in the literature review, this result contrasts with the majority of prior work examining the effect of the initial endowment on dictator behavior.

Several differences between our design and previous work could account for these conflicting results. First, we include behavior for all integer initial endowments between 0 and 10, whereas most of the previous work only includes the extreme cases where the dictator starts with either all or none of the endowment (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2012, 2015; Halvorsen, 2015; Hauge et al., 2016; Goerg et al., 2017). Second, we have a within-subjects design where all subjects make a sequence of dictator decisions for all possible initial endowment distributions. Thus, our subjects experience changes in the initial endowment.

Due to our experimental design, we are able to restrict our data to examine which of these two differences, changes in initial endowments or extreme initial endowments, are more responsible for the effects we see in this paper. First, we perform a within-subjects analysis of the extreme distributions. To do so, we take all the data from the neutral frame and restrict our attention to the dictator allocations when the initial endowments are (10,0) or (0,10). Note that this means that we will have two behavioral observations for each dictator. When we run a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find that there are significant differences in how much the dictator keeps when they start with 0 or 10 tokens ( $p < 0.01$ ). This test provides an opportunity to more directly compare our results to those obtained in Visser and Roelofs (2011) and Korenok et al. (2014). Both of those papers use a within-subjects design and vary the distribution of the initial endowment between the dictator and recipient. Both also find that when the recipient starts with all of the initial endowment, the final payoff for the recipient is higher i.e. the dictator tends not to take as much for herself. Thus, all three papers (ours and these) find a significant effect of initial endowments on dictator behavior when dictators are exposed to a sequence of changing initial endowments.

Next, we perform a between-subjects analysis on the non-extreme distribution of (5,5). Specifically, we restrict our data in the neutral frame to the first choice that each dictator makes. In our experiment, this first choice

was under the initial endowment distribution of (10,0), (5,5), or (0,10). This restriction removes any impact of prior exposure to other initial endowments, giving us a between-subjects design. We run the Kruskal-Wallis test on this data. We find that there is no difference in the distributions of final allocations ( $p = 0.413$ ).

Restricting our data to only the dictator's first choice also provides us an opportunity to more directly compare our results to those obtained in a working paper by Grossman and Eckel (2012) as well the results of Krupka and Weber (2013). In Grossman and Eckel (2012), the authors run three between-subjects treatments: those with initial endowments of (\$20, \$0), (\$10, \$10), and (\$0, \$20). They find no difference between the final amounts donated to a charity when the initial endowments are (\$20,\$0) and (\$0,\$20), but do find a significant difference when the initial endowments are (\$10,\$10). However, when we run the same analysis (a Fligner-Policello Robust Rank Order Test) on our data, we find no significant differences between any of these three treatments (Endowment 0 vs. 10,  $p = 0.276$ ; Endowment 5 vs. 10,  $p = 0.968$ ; Endowment 0 vs. 5,  $p = 0.220$ ).

We also present the non-parametric equivalent to the regression in the paper to make the result comparable to the previous results. For this test, we restrict our attention to the neutral frame and to those subjects whose first choice was under either the (10,0) or (0,10) initial endowment. With these restrictions, we run a Mann-Whitney U test and find no significant effect ( $p = 0.233$ ). The conclusion that our data support is that a sequence of changes in the initial endowment significantly impacts dictators' final allocation decisions. The support for this is most readily seen in the first Wilcoxon signed-rank test testing the differences of the extreme distribution (between-subjects, endowment 10 vs. endowment 0). The interpretation we offer is that the changes in initial endowments act as a procedural frame (Larick and Blount, 1997; Kahneman, 2000). This is consistent with reference dependence-changes from an initial point are salient.

Our combination of results can offer a way to think about the conflicting results in the literature. The prior work focuses on what happens to dictator allocations when they are exposed to one initial endowment. The treatments then vary the initial endowment using a between-subjects design allocating the entire endowment to either the dictator or the recipient. This prior work tends to find that initial endowment distributions do not affect final allocations. Our work cannot speak to other nuances in the literature that may be contributing to differences. Specifically, there is an interesting observation to

be made when examining Krupka and Weber (2013) and Grossman and Eckel (2012). In those papers, the designs are between-subjects and the baseline is a standard dictator game (where the initial endowment rests with the dictator). The treatment is a dictator game where 50% of the initial endowment rests with the dictator and 50% rests with the recipient. Comparing their baseline to their treatment, they both find significant differences. Though we too are able to restrict our analysis to a between-subjects comparison of the initial endowments of (10,0) or (5,5), we find no effect on final allocations. However, we struggle to perfectly identify why we obtain no effect as we cannot rule out subject pool differences (e.g. we use MTurkers) as well as differences in payoff size (our payoffs range between \$0 and \$1). There is evidence, for example, that stake size matters substantially for these framing effects (Leibbrandt et al., 2015).



## Appendix C. Experimental Instructions

### *Appendix C.1. Choice experiments*

In the *choice experiments*, participants in both tax- and neutrally-framed treatments read the same introduction. These participants also complete the same 10-item questionnaires and demographic questionnaire shown below. The only difference between the treatments is in the framing.

#### *Appendix C.1.1. Tax-framed*

##### *Introduction*

[Overview of Tasks]

This is a study in decision making that has three parts. You will earn a 50 cent base pay for completing the study.

In the first part, we will ask you to tell us what you think about various images.

In the second part, you will have a chance to earn a bonus. Your earnings for the second part will be in tokens, which will be converted to money. Every 10 tokens you earn is worth \$1 to you. Your earnings will depend on the decisions you make and on the decision that the other worker you paired with will make.

In the final third part, we will ask you to tell us about yourself.

You will be paid the base plus the bonus within 3 days after you complete this task.

Note: If you are using Internet Explorer you will not be able to complete the survey. Please try using Safari, Firefox, or Chrome

##### *10-item questionnaire*

[Tell Us What You Think]

You will now be shown several pairs of pictures of people. Please indicate which person in each pair you find more attractive.

[Tell Us What You Think]

Please indicate which person in each pair you find more attractive.




Figure C.1: Screen shot of one of the person selection task in the 10-item questionnaire. Participants in all treatments make a selection for 5 similar sets of images of individuals.

Fig. C.1 is an example of what these pairs of pictures of people look like. They make selection between 5 different pairs of images.

[Tell Us What You Think]

On the next screen you will see two images of people waiting in lines. Please indicate which line you think is the longest.

[Tell Us What You Think]

Please indicate which line you think is the longest.

Fig. C.2 is an example of what this pair of images of lines looks like. They make this selection once.




Figure C.2: Screen shot of the line length selection task in the 10-item questionnaire. Participants in all treatments see the same pair of images and make a selection for this pair.

[Tell Us What You Think]

You will now be shown several states. For each state, please answer the following question: What was the state's average temperature in 2013?

[Tell Us What You Think]

What was the state's average temperature in 2013?

Fig. C.3 is an example of what these temperature selection questions look like. They make this selection for 4 different states.




Figure C.3: Screen shot of one the states in the state temperature selection task in the 10-item questionnaire. Participants in all treatments make a selection for 4 different states.

### *Tax-framed dictator games*

[Bonus Task]

For the following task, you will be randomly paired with another person, whom we will call your match. The match will be randomly selected from the other workers.

[Bonus Task]

In our economy one way the government uses taxes is to generate revenue from its citizens' earnings to redistribute wealth. The government's role in redistributing this wealth can be large or small. Sometimes people have a lot of wealth in our economy and sometimes people have little wealth in our economy.

You have the opportunity to tell the government if it should get involved in wealth redistribution between you and your match and, if so, how large or small the redistribution should be. If your decision is selected for payment, it will determine how many tokens each person gets paid in this task.

[Bonus Task]

When you and your match have entered all of your decisions, we will then randomly pick one of the decisions from the set that you and your match made. The selected decision will determine the final token split between you and your match and will be paid out to you as a bonus for this task.

[Bonus Task]

In this economy your wealth is  $X$  tokens and your match's wealth is  $Y$  tokens.

Use the slider to indicate whether you want the government involved and how large or small the redistribution should be.

Make a decision by moving the slider.

To confirm, your post-tax wealth for this decision is  $W$  tokens.

To confirm, your match's post-tax wealth for this decision is  $V$  tokens.

Fig. C.4 is a screen shot of the decision page that participants saw. They may move the slider to indicate their choice. They do this for 11 different endowment scenarios, ranging from when they are endowed with all 10 tokens and their match is endowed with 0 tokens down to when they are endowed with 0 tokens and their match is endowed with all 10 tokens.

*Demographic questionnaire*




Figure C.4: Screen shot of one of the decision screens for individuals in the tax-framed *choice experiment*. Participants make a choice by moving the slider. The fields update dynamically as they move the slider to reflect the final amount of allocation for themselves and for the other worker. Participants make this selection for endowments 0 to 10.

[Tell Us About Yourself]

Please complete the following demographic survey. Your responses will not be connected to your worker ID.

[Tell Us About Yourself]

In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself: [A Republican, A Democrat, Leaning more towards the Democratic party, Leaning more towards the Republican party]

What is your age?

What is your gender? [Male, Female]

Which one of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? [Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic/Latino, White, Other]

Have you ever voted in a government election? [Yes/No]

#### *Appendix C.1.2. Neutrally-framed*

Participants in the neutrally-framed treatment complete the same 10-item questionnaire and demographic questions as participants in the tax-framed treatment. However, instead of playing the tax-framed dictator games, participants in this treatment play 11 neutrally-framed dictator games.

#### *Neutrally-framed dictator games*

[Bonus Task]

For the following task, you will be randomly paired with another person, whom we will call your match. The match will be randomly selected from the other workers.

[Bonus Task]

You will be shown 11 situations. In each situation, at least one of you will be holding some number of tokens. You will decide whether you would like to give some tokens to your match, take some tokens from your match or do nothing.

[Bonus Task]

When you and your match have entered all of your decisions, we will then randomly pick one of the decisions from the set that you and your match made. The selected decision will determine the final token split between you and your match and will be paid out to you as a bonus for this task.

[Bonus Task]

For this decision you own  $X$  tokens and the other person owns  $Y$  tokens.

You have the opportunity to take any of the  $X$  tokens from the other person. If this decision is selected for payment this will determine how many tokens each person gets.

Use the slider to indicate how many tokens you wish to take or give.

Make a decision by moving the slider.

To confirm, your earnings for this decision will be  $W$  tokens.

To confirm, the other person's earnings for this decision will be  $V$  tokens.

Fig. C.5 is a screen shot of the decision page that participants saw. They may move the slider to indicate their choice. As in the tax-framed treatment, they do this for 11 different endowment scenarios, ranging from when they are endowed with all 10 tokens and their match is endowed with 0 tokens down to when they are endowed with 0 tokens and their match is endowed with all 10 tokens.

## *Appendix C.2. Norms elicitation experiments*

Participants in the tax- and neutrally-framed treatments read the same introduction. They also complete the same demographics questionnaire and 10-item questionnaire as those participants in the *choice experiment*.

### *Appendix C.2.1. Tax-framed*

#### *Introduction*

[Overview of Tasks]

This is a study in decision making that has three parts. You will earn a 50 cent base pay for completing the study.






Figure C.5: Screen shot of one of the decision screens for individuals in the neutrally-framed *choice experiment*. Participants make a choice by moving the slider. The fields update dynamically as they move the slider to reflect the final amount of allocation for themselves and for the other worker. Participants make this selection for endowments 0 to 10.

In the first part, we will ask you to tell us about yourself.

In the second part, we will ask you to tell us what you think about various images.

In the third part, you will have a chance to earn a bonus. Your earnings for this part will depend on the decisions you make and on the decisions that the other worker you are paired with makes. You can earn up to \$3.30 in bonus pay.

You will be paid the base plus the bonus within 3 days after you complete this task.

Note: If you are using Internet Explorer you will not be able to complete the survey. Please try using Safari, Firefox, or Chrome

[Ready to Start Part One!]

We are ready to start the first part. This is where you tell us about yourself.

Participants then complete the same demographic questionnaire as in the *choice experiment*. Then participants read instructions for the coordination games. The language of these coordination game differ by the frame in which the game is described in.

*Explanation of coordination games with tax-framed language*

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

On the next screens you will read about decisions that another Mturker made in a previous Hit. We will call this Mturker “worker A”. Worker A is NOT participating today, but made choices in a previous Hit. You will read about the decisions worker A faced and what actions worker A had to choose between.

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

In our economy one way the government uses taxes is to generate revenue from its citizens’ earnings to redistribute wealth. The government’s role in redistributing this wealth can be large or small. Sometimes people have a lot of wealth in our economy and sometimes people have little wealth in our economy.

Worker A was randomly paired with another Mturker, called worker B. Worker A faced several different situations in which he or she had the opportunity to tell the government if it should get involved in wealth redistribution between them and worker B and, if so, how large or small the redistribution should be. Their wealth was represented by tokens, where every 10 tokens was worth \$1.

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

Your job is to rate worker A's wealth redistribution decision based on whether you think the decision was

“socially appropriate”

and

“consistent with what most people who are like you think that worker A OUGHT to do”.

That sounds simple, but it is only half the story!

Specifically, you will only earn the bonus if your “social appropriateness” rating MATCHES the rating of another Mturker working on this HIT today who is like you. We will call this Mturker “your match.”

We will match you with another Mturker who is like you. To increase the chances that you earn the bonus, you should try to imagine what your match, who is like you, would say.

Then participants complete the same 10-item questionnaire as those in the *choice experiments*.

#### *Coordination games with tax-framed language*

Participants then make rating decisions for a single endowment for each of the possible actions that the dictator could take (e.g. redistributing 0 to 10 tokens). They make the same rating decisions for when the dictator has an endowment of 0, 5, and 10 tokens. Below is an example of what a participant in the tax-framed treatment sees when rating the 11 dictator choices in the scenario where the dictator is endowed with 5 tokens.

[Ready To Start Part Three - The Bonus Task]

We are ready to start part three: This is where you can earn a bonus!

[Bonus Task]

On the next screens you will read about decisions that worker A, an Mturker from another HIT, made. The description will include possible actions available to worker A.

Your task is to rate worker A's wealth redistribution decision based on your guess of whether your MATCH, who is like you, would think the decision was "socially appropriate" and "consistent with what someone who is like you would think worker A OUGHT to do."

Remember that you will only earn the bonus if your "social appropriateness" rating is that same as your MATCH's rating. For each rating that is the same, you will earn 10 cents.

[Bonus Task]

In this economy worker A's wealth was 5 tokens and worker B's wealth was 5 tokens.

Worker A was able to decide whether the government should get involved and how large or small the redistribution should be.

Worker A got the government involved and chose to take a tax transfer of 5 tokens from worker B.

As a result:

Worker A's post-tax wealth for this decision was 10 tokens.

Worker B's post-tax wealth for this decision was 0 tokens.

TASK: Your task is to rate worker A's wealth redistribution decision based on your guess of whether your MATCH would think that the decision is "socially appropriate" and "consistent with what someone who is like you would think worker A OUGHT to do."

I think my MATCH would rate this decision as ["Very socially appropriate," "Socially appropriate," "Somewhat socially appropriate," "Somewhat socially inappropriate," "Socially inappropriate," "Very socially inappropriate."]

Fig. C.6 is a screen shot of the decision page that participants saw. They may select a rating by moving their mouse over the drag down box. Participants rate each of the 11 actions (that would result in Worker A having post-tax wealth of 10 to 0, before moving on to the next endowment and rating the next set of 11 actions for for that endowment. Participants do this for endowments 0, 5 (as in our example), and 10.




Figure C.6: Screen shot of one of the decision screens for individuals in the tax-framed *norms elicitation experiment*. Participants make a choice by selecting from the drop down box. Participants make this selection for all 11 action (resulting in the participants holding 0 to 10 tokens at the end of the reallocation). They do this for endowments 0, 5, and 10.

### *Appendix C.2.2. Neutrally-framed*

Participants in the neutrally-framed treatment complete the same 10-item questionnaire and demographic questionnaire as participants in the tax-framed treatment. The only differences in instructions for these participants and their tax-framed counterparts are the explanation of the coordination games and the actual coordination games.

#### *Explanation of coordination games with neutrally-framed language*

Instead of the instructions that the tax-framed participants receive earlier,

participants in this treatment read the following:

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

On the next screens you will read about decisions that another Mturker made in a previous Hit. We will call this Mturker “worker A.” Worker A is NOT participating today, but made choices in a previous Hit. You will read about the decisions worker A faced and what actions worker A had to choose between.

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

Worker A was randomly paired with another Mturker, called worker B. Worker A faced several different situations in which he or she was holding some number of tokens, where every 10 tokens was worth \$1. Worker A then had to decide whether he or she would like to give some tokens to worker A, take some tokens from worker B, or do nothing.

[Explaining How You Will Earn Money In The Bonus Task]

Your job is to rate worker A’s decision based on whether you think the decision was

“socially appropriate”  
and

“consistent with what most people who are like you  
think that worker A OUGHT to do”.

That sounds simple, but it is only half the story!

Specifically, you will only earn the bonus if your “social appropriateness” rating MATCHES the rating of another Mturker working on this HIT today who is like you. We will call this Mturker “your match.”

We will match you with another Mturker who is like you. To increase the chances that you earn the bonus, you should try to imagine what your match, who is like you, would say.

Then these participants complete the same 10-item questionnaire as those in the *choice experiments*. Instead of the instructions for the tax-framed coordination game, participants in this treatment read about and play neutrally-framed coordination for 3 different endowments, as in the tax-framed treatment. Similar to their counterparts in the tax-framed treatment, these participants make rating decisions for each of the 11 possible actions for when the dictator has an endowment of 0, 5, and 10 tokens.

Below is an example of what a participant in the neutrally-framed treatment sees when rating the 11 dictator choices in the scenario where the dictator is endowed with 0 tokens and the match is endowed with all 10 tokens.

*Coordination games with neutrally-framed language*

[Ready To Start Part Three - The Bonus Task!]

We are ready to start part three: This is where you can earn a bonus!

[Bonus Task]

On the next screens you will read about decisions that worker A, an Mturker from another HIT, made. The description will include possible actions available to worker A.

Your task is to rate worker A's decision based on your guess of whether your MATCH, who is like you, would think the decision was "socially appropriate" and "consistent with what someone who is like you would think worker A OUGHT to do".

Remember that you will only earn the bonus if your "social appropriateness" rating is the same as your MATCH's rating. For each rating that is the same, you will earn 10 cents.

[Bonus Task]

For this decision worker A owns 0 tokens and worker B owns 10 tokens.

Worker A had the opportunity to take any amount of worker B's 10 tokens from worker B.

Worker A choose to take 10 tokens from worker B.

As a result:

Worker A's post-earnings for this decision were 10 tokens.

Worker B's post-earnings for this decision were 0 tokens.

TASK: Your task is to rate worker A's wealth redistribution decision based on your guess of whether your MATCH would think that the decision is "socially appropriate" and "consistent with what someone who is like you would think worker A OUGHT to do."

I think my MATCH would rate this decision as ["Very socially appropriate," "Socially appropriate," "Somewhat socially appropriate," "Somewhat socially inappropriate," "Socially inappropriate," "Very socially inappropriate."]

Fig. C.7 is a screen shot of the decision page that participants saw. Similar to the tax-framed condition, participants rate each of the 11 actions (that would result in Worker A having post-earnings of 10 to 0, before moving on to the next endowment and rating the next set of 11 actions for for that endowment. Participants do this for endowments 0, 5 (as in our example), and 10.






Figure C.7: Screen shot of one of the decision screens for individuals in the neutrally-framed *norms elicitation experiment*. Participants make a choice by selecting from the drop down box. Participants make this selection for all 11 action (resulting in the participants holding 0 to 10 tokens at the end of the reallocation). They do this for endowments 0, 5, and 10.